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THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW RELATING TO
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF PRO-
MOTERS.
PART I.
PROMOTERS: THEIR RELATIONSHIPS AND
LIABILITIES.
CHAPTER I.
§ i. Who are promoters.
It may be said, generally, that any person who does an act
with reference to the formation of a company or in aid of its
organization is, as regards that act, a "promoter" of the com-
pany. As the term originated in trade and not in the law
no technical legal definition is possible, but it has been well
described in the following manner: "In the law relating to
corporations, those persons are called 'promoters' of a com-
pany who first associate themselves together for the purpose
of organizing the company, issuing its prospectus, procuring
subscriptions to the stock, securing a charter, etc." 1 Or as
was said by Bowen, J.,2 it is a term, " usefully summing up in
a single word a number of business operations familiar to the
commercial world, by which a company is generally brought
into existence."
1 Black's Law Dictionary.
2 Whaley Bridge Calico Printing Co. v. Green, L. R. 28,P. B. D. 351.
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The only requisite, therefore, to bring one within the mean-
ing of the term is, that he shall have performed some act with
a view to the formation of a company. As to what acts are
usually done in the projection or floating of a corporation, is
more a matter of business experience than of law, but among
the most usual and necessary might be mentioned (those to
which reference has already been made), viz., the issuing of
the prospectus, inducing others to subscribe for stock, and
obtaining the charter.
§ 2. Relationship bet-ween corporations and their promoters.
Now, although any act done with reference to the creation
of a company will constitute one a promoter, it does not follow
that a status is created. The relationship thereby established
has no significance except as regards the act done. That is
to say: with respect to that act, the one doing it is a promoter
and subject to all the rights and liabilities which that term
implies; but if he should subsequently abandon the enterprise
he could not be held for acts done after his connection with
the project had ceased, on the broad ground that he was a
promoter of the company.
What rights and liabilities, then, does this term imply?
Promoters are universally held to be corporate fiduciaries,
standing in a relation of trust and confidence towards the
projected company and the stockholders, and bound to exer-
cise uberrimamfidem towards both.' This arises from the fact
that promoters usually hold themselves out as deeply inter-
ested in the proposed corporation, and as acting for it. They
take *upon themselves to bring into existence this creature of
the law which, in its inchoate state, is completely at their
mercy, unprotected by impartial agents acting solely for the
benefit of the stockholders. In view of these circumstances,
the acts of the promoters are strictly scrutinized.' Since they
I Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (1870) ; Chandler v. Bacon,
30 Fed. 538 (1887); Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant, L. R. ii Ch.
Div. 918 (1878) ; Simons v. Vulcan Oil & Mining Co., 6I Pa. 202 (1869) ;
McElhenny's App., 61 Pa. 188 (1869); Bagnell v. Carlton, L. R. 6 Ch.
Div. 376 (1877).
2 Sombrero Phosphate Co. v. Erlanger, L. R.. 3 App. Cas. 1218.
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stand in a trust relation, they are prohibited from making any
profit other than is common to all the stockholders, or receiv-
ing any secret advantage whatsoever, and this relation exists
even in favor of those who subsequently become stock-
holders.1
The results of the cases on this question may be summed
up in four propositions:
(i.) Where a promoter buys property intending to sell it to
the company (already in process of formation) he cannot make
a prodt on the transaction without the fullest disclosure?
(2.) But where one owns property he is at liberty to form a
company and sell to it at any price and without disclosing his
profit: provided, only, however, that he make no fraudulent
rnisrepresentations .
(3.) Where one buys property and soon after begins to pro-
raote a company, and declares that he bought the property for
the company, and effects a sale to the company, he is liable for
any profit made, on the ground that he has alleged that he
acted as an agent in the matter, and may not now be heard to
claim that he acted only for himself.'
(4.) If a promoter receive a gift or commission from the
vendors of property for arranging a sale to the company, he
must account therefor (less the amount of his disbursements)
for he may not secretly derive any benefit over the other
members in any transaction to which the intended company
is a party?
It results also from t is trust relation that if the project
fails, the promoters arc )ound to return the subscriptions to
the stockholders, and failure to do so renders them liable as
for a misuse of trust funds.'
It is evident from these results that this relation is of a
fiducial character and is similar to that existing between
trustee and cestui que tirust, principal and agent, or partner and
I Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (1870).
2Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant, L. R. II Ch. Div. 918 (1878).
SDensmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (187o).
4 Simons v. Vulcan Oil Co., 6Y Pa. 202 (r869).
5 Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Grant, L. R. ii Ch. Div. 918 (1878).
6 Nockles v. Crosby, 3 B. & C. 814.
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partner. In fact, in Bagzell v. Carlton,' the Court treats of the
promoters as trustees; Lord Cotton, in the same case, deals
with them as agents of the company; and Sharswood, J., in the
leading case of Densmore Oil Co. v. Dernsmore,2 draws an
analogy between the position of promoters in respect of the
company, and the relations of partners inter sese. -
In deciding as to whether promoters were liable to turn
over to the company secret profits, he said: "It is a familiar
principle of the law of partnerskip, that one partner cannot
buy and sell to the partnership at a profit; nor if a partner-
ship is in contemplation merely, can he purchase with a view
to a future sale without accounting for the profit." And on
this ground he rested the decision.
It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the analogy is perfect
as between promoters and either trustees, agents, or partners.
Strictly speaking, a promoter is none of these, but occupiesa
position in respect of which the law imposes certain dutie.i
similar to those imposed in the other instances. If one may use
the term, it is a quasi-agency or trusteeship3 The subject
becomes of practical importance only with regard to the sug-
gestion, that the promoters are agents of the company.
It is clear that if a promoter is treated as a technical agent,
then the corporation must be held liable for the promoters
acts done within the scope of his agency. That there cannot
be an agent when no principal is in existence seems equally
clear. We shall later have to discuss a line of cases in which
it was held that a technical agency exists, but reason and the
great weight of authority are against the proposition, and for
the present it is sufficient to say that the idea has been
thoroughly discredited.' The relationship, therefore, between
the promoter and the company is that of corporate fiduciary,
and is similar in its obligations to that of trustee or agent.5
The relationship ceases to exist when the corporation comes
into being, though it has been suggested that, even after
16 Ch. Div. 371 (1877).
264 Pa. 43 (1870).
3 Chandler v. Bacon, 30 Fed. 538 (1887).
4 See infra.
5 Chandler v. Bacon, 30 Fed. 538 (1887).
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incorporation, those engaged in placing the stock may still be
called promoters.'
§ 3. Relationship of promoters inter sese.
It is very generally stated in America that the projectors of
a company are partners, and that their mutual rights and
duties are determined by the law applicable to partnerships.2
In England, however, the theory obtains that the promoters
do not necessarily stand in this relation to each other, though
they may do so under certain circumstances. The actual
position which they occupy in any given case is a question of
fact for the jury3
Under the American rule, it is logically held that one pro-
moter cannot recover from another for anything due on
account of the formation of the company, in analogy to the
familiar doctrine of partnerships that one partner cannot
recover from another for anything due on account of the
partnership business.
While the American. doctrine thus broadly stated has
undoubtedly a just application in certain cases, it must not be
taken to mean that anyone who shall have done some act
with reference to the formation of the company, and thereby
become as to such act a promoter, is the partner of all others
who have similarly acted, and therefore liable to be charged for
their acts. Such a result would be unjust and could subserve
no good purpose. The rule must be understood to provide
that all those who act jointly in any transaction or series of
transactions with respect to the corporate formation, are, in so
doing, partners. The case of Witmer v. Schdatter4 was one
in which the doctrine of partnership was held applicable.
That was an action of assumpsit brought against Schlatter
and one hundred and seventy-six others as partners, who
under the title of the "Contracting Committee of the Phila. &
1 Bramwell, J., in Tuycross v. Grant, 2 C. P. Div. 503.
2Redfield on R. R., p. Ii, 3; Witmer v. Schlatter, 2 Rawle, 329 (IS 3 I);
Roberts Mfg. Co. v. Schlich, 64 N. W. 826 (Minn. 1895); Smith v.
Warden, 86 Mo. 399.
3 Milburn v. Codd, 7 B. & C. 419, s. c. i M. & R. 238.
42 Rawle, 329 (1831). See also Brewster v. Hatch, 25 N. R. 5oS (I89O).
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Pittsburgh Transportation Co." were carrying on business
intending to become incorporated. They authorized one
Harper to enter into a contract with the plaintiff in behalf of
the corporation afterwards to be formed. Suit was brought
against the individual members and a plea in confession and
avoidance entered by some of the defendants.
Gibson, C. J., held: "Against those who pleaded, the record
is undoubtedly that all who were alleged to be partners are so
in fact; but, although the fact of partnership may be estab-
lished by the separate admissions of all, it cannot be by the
admissions of less than all, for the plain reason that a confession
is competent to effect none but him who made it." "We are,
therefore, of opinion that the parties to the contract are
personally liable; but for the insufficiency of the evidence
of partnership as to some of the defendants, a new trial is
awarded."
The rule having been misinterpreted, however, the court, in
Railroad Gazette v. Wherry,' said: "It cannot be contended
that anyone who participates as a projector in the organization
of a proposeid corporation, can be held individually liable for
every contract which any other projector sees fit to make in
the name of the contemplated corporation, although such
contract is made without the authority, sanction or knowledge
of the party sought to be held liable." 2
It would seem, therefore, that any liability to be charged
upon a promoter, for the acts of his fellow promoters, must
rest rather upon the principles of agency than of partnership,3
though wherever the promoters have entered into such
relations that the elements of a partnership are present, all the
consequences of such a relation follow, and the act of one
done within the scope of the undertaking binds all,4 and each
must act with entire good faith as regards the others.' Under
any other circumstances, however, there is no relation of
158 Mo. App. 423 (1894).
2See also Johnson v. Corser, 25 N. W. 799 (Minn. 1885).
3 Hurt v. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 316 (1874); Beach on Corps., 159
Brewster v. Hatch, 25 N. E. 505 (189o).
5Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (1870).
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confidence between the promoters, and they may deal with
each other at arm's length.1
This being so, the distinction attempted to be drawn by
some writers between the English and American theories as
to the relationship existing between the promoters inter sese,
would seem to be of little practical importance, as there is a
substantial uniformity in the results reached.
§ 4. Personal liability of promoters for contracts made in the
corporate name.
Having considered the relationship in which promoters
stand to the corporation and to each other, it remains to
inquire how far they become personally responsible for their
acts done, or contracts made, in behalf of the corporation
which they have undertaken to create. And, first, it may be
taken as self-evident, that where the contract is not in fact
made on the faith of the corporation, but with the promoter
personally, even though it were intended for the benefit of the
future company, the promoter is individually liable; for the
engagement is his own.2
A corollary to this proposition is that where the contract on
which a plaintiff is attempting to hold a projector personally
liable, was made expressly between the plaintiff and the
intended company, the plaintiff assuming the risk that such a
company would be formed, and that when it came into exist-
ence it would bear the burden, and pay the plaintiff's claim,
no responsibility rests upon the promoter3
In Whitney v. Wyman' the defendant and others, describing
themselves as the " Prudential Committee of the Grand Haven
Fruit Basket Company," wrote to Whitney stating that the
company was partially organized, that certain machinery would
1 Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (1870).
Ruby Chief Mining Co. v. Gurley, 29 P. 668 (Colo. 1892) ; Perry v.
Little Rock, Etc., R. R., 44 Ark. 383 (,884); Carmody v. Powers, 26
N. W. 8oi (1886); Wilbur v. N. Y. Co., 12 N. Y. Supp. 456; Heleca Gold
Mining Co. v. O'Neill, i9 N. Y. Supp. 592.
3 Whitney v. Wyman, 1o U. S. 392. See contra (an old case) Furnival
v. Coombs, 5 M. & G. 736; Landman v. Entwistle, 7 W. H. & G. 632.
4 IOI U. S. 392.
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be needed, and ordering the machinery in the name of the-
company. Whitney addressed his reply to the "Grand Haven
Fruit Basket Company," stating that the machinery was in
process of construction. The goods were charged on the
plaintiff's books to the company, but no payment having been-
made he sued the members of the committee personally.
Swayne, J., held that there could be no recovery, saying:
"It seems to us entirely clear that both parties understood and
meant that the contract was to be, and in fact was, with the
corporation and not with the defendants individually."
In Landman v. Entwistle,' Parke, B., said: " It is clear that
plaintiff undertook to do the work, not upon a contract with
the provisional committee, but looking to the chance of the
scheme succeeding and of there being funds available for the
payment of his claim. '"2
In the absence of any express stipulation of this sort, ex-
empting the promoter from liability, he is responsible for all
acts done or contracts made by him or with his authority,
though they were so done or made in the name of the cor-
poration ;3 and this is so whether the proposed corporation is
never formed,4 or fails,5 and even though incorporation were
completed and the company had made itself responsible.' In
the latter case the plaintiff has a choice of remedies against the
promoter or the company,7 for the reason that the action of
the company by which it becomes bound is in effect the
making of a new contract, and that therefore the original
agreement between the plaintiff and the promoter is unaffected.8
The cases under this head may be divided into two classes:
(I.) Those in which the party contracting with the promoter
17 W. H. & G. 632.
2 See also Hersey v. Tully, 44 P. 854 (Colo. 1896).
3 Fredendall v. Taylor et al., 26 Wis. 286 (i86o).
4 Johnson v. Corser, 25 N. W. 799 (Minn. 1885).
51Roberts Mfg. Co. v. Schlich, 64 N. W. 826 (Minn. 1895); Hurt v.
Salisbury, 55 Mo. 316 (1874); Weatherford R. R. v. Granger, 24 S. V.
795 (Texas, 1894) ; Kerridge v. Hesse, 9 Car. & Payne, 200.
6 Queen City Furniture Co. v. Crawford, 30 S. W. 163 (Mo. 1895).
7 Scott v. Ebury, 36 L. J. C. P. 16r.
8 Queen City Furniture Co. v. Crawford, 30 S. W. 163 (Mo. x895). See
discussion, infra.
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believed that the corporation, in whose name the contract was
made, was in existence. (2.) Those in which he knew that
the corporation was in process of formation only. Let us
consider the grounds upon which the promoter's liability rests,
in connection with each of these classes separately.
(I.) Where the promoter has not disclosed the inchoate
condition of the company in whose name he contracts, he may
be held liable for breach of warranty of authority, on the
ground that where one contracts as agent he impliedly war-
rants that he has authority from his principal so to act. To
have such authority is manifestly impossible where the prin-
cipal is not yet in existence.' He can also be held liable on
the further ground that, "where an alleged principal could not
have authorized the contract, then it is plain from the begin-
ning that the contract can have no operation at all unless it
binds the professed agent. It is construed accordingly ut res
magis valeat quam pereat, and he is held to have contracted in
person." 2
(2.) It would seem that it is this latter principle alone which
can be applied where the projector has disclosed the incom-
plete condition of the company, or that fact has become known
to the other contracting party through extraneous sources.
§ 5. Liablityfor torts.
Manifestly, promoters should be held liable for torts com-
mitted in the formation of a corporation, as in any other
transaction, and it has accordingly been held that they are
liable in deceit for false representations made to induce sub-
scriptions to stock.'
§ 6. Recapitulation.
From the foregoing discussion it may be concluded, that
while promoters stand in a position of trust towards the
company, they are technically neither trustees nor agents,
and that unless they expressly stipulate against personal lia-
bility on their contracts they will be liable, although said
I Bishop on Contracts, loo; Collins v. Wright, 7 E. & B. 301.
2 Pollock on Contracts. * 107.
3 Gerhard v. Bates, 2 1I. & Bl. 476.
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contracts be made in the name and for the benefit of the
proposed corporation, and in spite of the fact that the corpora-
tion receives the benefit and assumes the obligation.
PART II.
THEORIES UPON WHICH THE CORPORATE
LIABILITY HAS BEEN ENFORCED.
CHAPTER II.
THE COMPANY NOT LIABLE FOR ACTS OF PROMOTERS.
§ I. Of the rile generally.
It may be safely said that the rule is now universally estab-
lished, that a corporation cannot be bound by the acts of its
promoters, qua promoters, before it comes into existence. A
very carefully considered decision in which this conclusion is
reached, and a case typical of the American authorities, is that
of Weatherford, Etc., R. R. v. Granger.' The Court there says :
"There are some propositions affecting this question upon
which the authorities seem to be in substantial accord. A
promoter, though he purport to act on behalf of the projected
corporation and not for himself, cannot be treated as agent,
because the nominal principal is not then in existence; and
hence, where there is nothing more than a contract by a pro-
moter in which he undertakes to bind the future corporation,
it ig generally conceded that it cannot be enforced."
The reason here given is the fundamental one upon which
the rule rests, and in view of the unanimity of the decisions
upon the point, a further discussion would seem to be un-
necessary.'
124 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894).
2In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div. 125 (1880) ; In re North-
umberland Avenue Hotel Co., 33 Ch. Div. x6 (1886) ; Perry v. Little
Rock, Etc., R. P.. Co., 44 Ark. 383 (1884) ; Marchand v. Loan and Pledge
Assn., 26 La. Ann. 389 (1874); Davis & Rankin v. Maysville Creamery
Assn., i63 Mo. App. 477 (1895); Western Screw Co. v. Cousley, 72 Ill.
534 (1874) ; In re Hereford Iron Works Co., L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 621 (1876) ;
Gunn v. Assurance Co., 12 C. B. N. S. 694 (1882) ; Hawkins v. Gold Co.,
52 Cal. 513 (1877) ; Morrison v. Gold Co., 52 Cal. 306 (1877) ; Pittsburgh
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It was, indeed, suggested in Mf'Dernott v. Harrson,' that
"the rule that the promoters cannot bind a corporation subse-
quently to be formed," does not apply to private corporations,
but only to those exercising a franchise of a public orquasipublic
character. As the case relied on by the Court as authority
for this proposition2 was a suit between two former promoters
of a company, on a contract made with regard to the future
management thereof (they being the sole proprietors), and as
the company was in no way implicated in the action, and the
decision was merely that such a contract was not illegal as
purporting to regulate the action of the intended company,
the suggested distinction seems to be without the support of
authority. It has not been followed elsewhere.
§ 2. Rule not applicable where there is a de facto corporation.
If, instead of a case in which a promoter has acted for an
inchoate company, one is supposed in which a defacto corpora-
tion has acted in its own behalf, the question may arise whether
if the body subsequently discovered the defect in its organiza-
and completed the quota of the statutory requirements, the
duly incorporated company becomes bound by the acts of the
defacto organization.
It would seem that there can be no objection in theory or
& Tenn. Copper Co. v. Puintrell, 20 S. W. 284 (Texas, 1892); Huron
Printing Co. v. Kittleson, 57 N. W. 233 (S. D. 1894) ; Schreyer v. 'Co.,
43 P. 7r9 (Oregon, 1896) ; Stowe v. Flagg, 72 Il1. 397 (1874) ; Weather-
ford R. R. Co. v. Granger, 24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894); Arapahoe Co. v.
Platt, 39 P. 584 (Colo. 1895); Long v. Citizens' Bank, 29 P. 878 (Utah,
1892); Battelle v. Cement Co., 33 N. W. 327 (Mo. 1887); Buffington v.
Bardon, 5o N. W. 776 (Wisc. 189 I ) ; McArthur v. Printing Co., 5 r N. W.
216 (Minn. 1892); Joy v. Manion, 28 .Mo. App. 55 (1887); Hill v. Gould,
129 ,o. io6 (1895), dictum; Stowe v. Flagg, 72 111. 397 (1874) ; Gent v.
Ins. Co., 107 Ill. 652 (1883); Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Hart, 31 Md. 6o
(1869); Munson v. R. R., io3 N. Y. 58 (1886); Heleca Gold Co. v.
O'Neill, i N. Y. Supp. 592 (1892) ; Rogers v. Texas Land Co., 134 N. Y.
197 (1S9 2) ; Oakes v. Cattaraugus Co., r43 N. Y. App. 430 (894) ; Burden
v. Burden, 4 N. Y. Supp. 499; Payne v. Coal Co., io Exch. 281 ('1854) ;
Caledonian R. R. v. Helensburg, 2 Macq. H. of L. 393 (i856).
19 N. Y. Supp. 184 (1890).
2 Lorillard v. Clyde, 86 N. Y. 384.
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upon grounds of policy to holding the company liable. The
rule under discussion has no application, for it refers merely to
corporations not in esse. In contemplation of law, however,
a de facto company has an actual existence as a corporation,
and the fulfilment of the formal requisites adds nothing to the
corporate vitality, nor does it in any true sense change the
constitution or character of the body. The act of one was in
all fairness and equity the act of the other. So it has been
held that, under such circumstances, the company after due
organization, is bound by its previous acts, for the acts are its
own and not those of mere promoters.
§ .3. Company bound where the charter so provides.
It has been decided, and there are numerous dicta to the
same effect, that if the charter provides that a contract made
by promoters of a company shall be binding upon it, or if the
charter gives to the promoters power to bind the corporation,
and they exercise the power so given before organization is
completed, then in either event the corporation upon coming
into existence will be bound.
The case of Tilson v. Town of Warwick Gas Light Co.,2 was
an action of debt brought by the attorneys who had obtained
the act incorporating the defendant company. The act pro-
vided that all costs of procuring it should be paid and
discharged by the company. Bayley, J., said: "Now, where
an Act of Parliament casts upon a party an obligation to pay
a specific sum of money to particular persons, the law then
enables those persons to maintain an action of debt," and
judgment was thereupon rendered for the plaintiff.
It is to be noted that the Court treats of the obligation of
the defendant as one created by statute, and not as resting
'Wood v. Wheelen, 93 111. 153 (1879).
'4B. & C. 9 61 (1825).
sSee also Gent v. Merchants Ins. Co., 107 111. 652 (1883); Munson v.
Ry. Co., 1o3 N. Y. S8 (I886) ; Preston v. R. R. Co., 5 H. of L. 6o5 (1856);
_In re Rotheram, L. J. N. S. 219; Low v. R. R. Co., 45 N. H. 385 (1864);
Ely v. Assn., 34 L. T. N. S. i9o; Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Helensburg, 2
Macq. H. of L. 393 (1856) ; Touche v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 6 Ch. App.
671 (1870) ; Hill v. Gould, 129 Mo. io6 (I895) ; Weatherford R. R. v.
Granger, 24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894).
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upon the intention of the parties or the circumstances of the
case. It is the force of the statute that obligates the company
to make payment, although it is the contract made with the
promoter that allows the plaintiff to bring his action in debt
for a specific sum, rather than in the form of a quantum meruit,
for the reasonable value of the services rendered. The case
does not decide, therefore, that any liability would exist in the
absence of statutory provision.
The American cases cited in the note usually treat of the
obligation as resting upon the intention of the parties or the
circumstances of the case, and give effect to the charter pro-
vision merely as allowing a recovery against the company.
Such recovery would otherwise be denied, on the ground that
the rights of shareholders would be impaired by permitting it,
as they had no notice of these claims for services rendered
prior to incorporation. The obligation exists under such a
view independent of the charter, and there is no objection to
enforcing it when the charter has protected the rights of inno-
cent third parties taking stock, by warning them of the
incumbrances upon the property which they are about to
purchase.
It is held in England that the mention of the contract in
articles of association, or even a statement contained therein
that one of the objects for which the company is to be formed,
is the payment of the plaintiff's claim, do not bind the cor-
poration as do like provisions contained in the charter.' It
would seem that the distinction drawn must be based upon
the fact that the charter being an Act of Parliament is obliga-
tory irrespective of contract, while the articles of association
constitute at most only an agreement between the parties to
them.
It would seem that from the point of view adopted by the
American courts, as to the purpose and effect of such pro-
visions, that articles of association duly recorded according to
statute, should put purchasers of stock upon notice of prelimi-
I In re Empress Engineering Company, 16 Ch. Div. 125 (I88o) ; Howard
v. Patent Ivory Mfg. Co., L. R. 38 Ch. Div. x56 (i888) ; In re Rotheram,
L. J. N. S. 219; Ely v. Association, 34 L. T. N. S. z9o.
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nary expenses incurred in the formation of the company, as
effectively as would a charter.
§ 4. Suggestion that conzpany bound where all the projectors
have contracted.
It has been suggested (though what was said in the case
was purely dictum) that, where all the stockholders of a
corporation were parties to a contract made before organiza-
tion, the company should be liable in equity upon the contract,
on the ground that in substance, at least, the contract was made
by the company itself.'
This theory, if permissible at all, could only be applied where
no strangers to the contract had, subsequent to it, become inter-
ested in the corporation; for otherwise those would be charged
who had no part in the transaction.' Since such a rule over-
looks the distinction between the corporation and its members#
there would seem little reason for its adoption, and, indeed, it
has been expressly repudiated in at least two well-considered
cases.
4
§ 5.. Doctrine that corporation is in esse when charter granted
but no organization has taken place.
It has also been suggested that if, under a general incor-
poration law, articles of association have been taken out; or if
a charter has been granted by legislative enactment, though
organization has not taken place thereunder; in either case
the corporation is sufficiently formed to be treated as being in
esse, and may be bound by the acts of a majority of the
corporators or promoters.
The idea originated in Hall v. Vermont, Etc., R. R. Co., in
which case the Court said : " It may be true that the company
was not invested with full corporate powers until after the
stock was subscribed, and their organization perfected in the
'Weatherford R. R. Co. v. Granger, 24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894).
'Paxton v. Bacon Mill Co., 2 Nev. 257 (1866).
3 Chicago Coffin Co. v. Fritz, 41 Mo. App. 389.
4 Battelle v. Cement Co., 33 N. W. 327 (1887) ; Little Rock, Etc., R. R.
Co. v. Perry, 37 Ark. 164 (I88I).
528 Vt. 401 (i856).
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choice of directors ; yet the corporation was in esse before the
event; it had an inchoate existence and the corporators had
the power and were so far the agents of the corporation as to
bind them by any act which they were required to do, or
which was necessary to perfect their organization under the
charter."
While the result reached may be entirely justifiable, the
grounds on which it proceeds involve considerable difficulty.
It would seem that if the services were necessary to the
company, and rendered with the expectation of compensation,
the law would imply a promise to pay their reasonable value,
and there would be no necessity for the Court to make use of
the fictions of agency, and of corporate existence before organ-
ization.
The rule laid down in this case appeared as a dictum in
Low v. R. R. Co.,' where it was said, (after a discussion of the
above decision): "If it were true that, at the time the services
were rendered, the corporation had no capacity to contract-
which is by no means clear after the charter has been accepted-
still, etc., etc.," and later: "The grantees named in the charter
are the sole members of the corporation, until associates are
admitted by them; and they may, at a meeting duly called
and holden; accept the charter and choose directors and other
corporate officers. They may, indeed, proceed to discharge
the duties devolved upon the corporation by its charter with-
out the admission of any associates. It is obvious, then, that
to bind the corporation by an acceptance of the charter, or
other act the concurrence of at least a majority of the grantees
or members is necessary."
It will be seen later that in the Pennsylvania case of Bell's
Gap R. R. Co. v. Christy,2 the Court under a misapprehension
of this rule, as laid down in Low v. R. R., have confused it
with the rule that "a man will not be allowed to unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another," and instead of using
the two theories disjunctively, as is done in Low v. R. R. Co.,
have made the consent of a majority of the corporators a pre-
'45 N. H. 370 (1864).
279 Pa. 54. (1875).
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requisite to a recovery in quasi-contract. The same anomalous
doctrine is held in the later Pennsylvania case of Tift v. Bank.'
These latter cases, however, need not be further considered
at this time, as they are not authorities for the proposition
laid down in Hall v. Vermont, Etc., R. R. Co.; that proposi-
tion not having been understood as interpreted in Low v. R.
R. Co.
Suffice it to say, that the rule under discussion has only
been enunciated (as far as can be ascertained) in one other
case,2 and is now generally ignored. It has also been expressly
denied,8 and would seem to be out of accord with the general
rule, that the corporate franchises remain in abeyance till all
the requirements of incorporation are fulfilled.'
As to what requirements are essential, and what may be
overlooked without causing a fatal flaw in the corporate
structure, is a question somewhat foreign to the present discus-
sion; suffice it to say that it has been held (under a general
incorporation law) that where the final certificate has been
issued, but not properly recorded, the company is in esse and
bound by its acts.5
CHAPTER III.
I. THE FORMER ENGLISH EQUITY RULE.
§ I.
Much of the confusion in thought which is apparent in the
decisions upon the subject of corporate liability for the acts of
promoters is due, it is believed, to a view formerly entertained
in England and originating in the courts of equity, that a com-
pany is the successor to its promoters, stepping into their place
and assuming all their rights and liabilities. Or, as the thought
appeared later in a modified form, if the association of projectors
and the corporation are not one and the same body in different
stages of existence, the promoters are, at least, agents of the
1141 Pa. 550 (1891).
2 Harrison v. Vt. Manganese Co., 20 N. Y. Supp. 894.
Gent v. Ins. Co., 107 Ill. 652 (1883) ; R. R. Co. v. Ketchum, 37 Conn.
170 (1858).
4 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 791.
5R. R. Gazette v. Wherry, 58 Mo. App. 423 (1893.)
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company and can bind it for all purposes of organization.
Now though, in these cases, the courts generally declared
that the basis of their conclusion lay in the fact that the com-
pany had received a benefit and must assume the corresponding
burden, they uniformly enforced the contract made by the pro-
moters against the corporation, granting specific performance
thereof (without regard to the actuality of the benefits accruing
to the corporation), wherever it appeared that the party con-
tracting with the promoter had fulfilled his part of the agree-
ment. It would seem that, unless the Court conceived of the
promoters as agents of the company with authority to bind it
by contract, specific performance could not have been granted,
however just it might be, to hold the company liable for the
reasonable value of the plaintiff's land and services.
These cases will be considered at some length, because it is
believed that the theory which they advance originated in a
misapprehension of authority; and though this has been
pointed out and the doctrine repudiated in England, the cases
are not infrequently quoted in the American decisions. So far
as they are to be taken to lay down the proposition that one
cannot be allowed "to unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another," they are not to be questioned, but the results
reached disprove the suggestion that this was the only prin-
ciple invoked.
In the case of Vauxhall Bridge Co. v. Earl of Spencer,1 Lord
Eldon threw out the suggestion that the withdrawing of
opposition to a bill in Parliament might, under certain circum-
stances, constitute a valid consideration for a contract.
A few years later, the case of Edwards v. The Grand Junction
R. R. Co.2 came up. Edwards, the complainant, filed a bill
praying for an injunction to restrain the defendant company
from completing its road until it had complied with the terms
of a certain contract entered into with complainant by the
promoters. There had been a preliminary organization of the
company, and application made for a charter. Edwards and
others, trustees of a turnpike company, opposed the bill in
'Jacob, 64 (1821); 2 Madd. 356.
2 1 M. & C. 650 (1836).
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Parliament. In consideration of the withdrawal of this oppo-
sition, the preliminary organization agreed that the company
should construct and maintain a bridge of certain dimensions
across the tracks for the pike to run over. To enforce this
contract against the company the bill was filed.
Lord Cottenham, in delivering the judgment, said: "The
objection to the bill rests upon grounds purely technical, and
these applicable only to actions at law. The question is not
whether there be any legal binding contract at law, but whether
the Court will permit the company to use the powers under
the act in direct opposition to the arrangement with the
trustees before the act, and upon the faith of which they were
permitted to obtain such powers. If the company and the
projectors cannot be identified, still it is clear that the com-
pany have acceded to and are now in possession of all the
projectors had before. They are entitled to all their rights
and subject to all their liabilities. If any one individual had
projected such a scheme and, in prosecution of it, had entered
into an arrangement, and then had assigned all his interest in it
to another, there could be no legal obligation between those who
dealt with the original and such purchaser; but in this Court
it would be otherwise. So here, as the company stands in the
place of the projectors, they cannot repudiate the arrangement
into which such projectors have entered in their corporate
capacity; they cannot use the powers given by Parliament to
such projectors and refuse to comply with those terms, upon
the faith of which all opposition to their obtaining such powers
was withheld." The injunction was Jgranted, his lordship
resting his decision on the case of Vauxhall Bridge Co. v.
Lord Spencer, which, as we have seen, merely suggested that
withdrawing opposition might be good consideration for a
contract, but did not even hint that the company would be
bound if the contract were made before incorporation.
Here, then, we have the bold annunciation of the theory,
unsupported by any adequate authority, that the " company
stands in the place of the projectors" and "cannot repudiate
the arrangement into which such projectors have entered in
their corporate capacity." And his lordship's statement,
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"If the company and the projectors cannot be identified," etc.,
is no qualification of this position, for he goes on to say,
"still it is clear that the company have acceded to and are
now in possession of all that the projectors had before. They
are entitled to all their rights and subject to all their liabilities."
This is in effect making the projectors and the company iden-
tical, for the conception of the Court seems to be that the
company, upon coming into existence, was substituted for the
promoters, and that all those -contracts which were binding
upon the promoters were necessarily obligatory upon the
corporation.
In the two later cases of Stanley v. 2he Chester & Birken-
head R. R. Co.,' and Petre v. Eastern Counties R. R. Co.,2 in
which the facts were practically the same, Lord Cottenham
arrived at similar results upon the same reasoning, both being
bills in equity. See also'
The doctrihe was again advanced in the leading case of
Preston v. Liver.pool & Manchester R. R. ' That was a bill
praying specific performance of a contract entered into with
the promoters of the company. Two associations were apply-
ing for charters to run roads over practically the same route.
As only one charter would be granted, it was agreed between
them that the successful applicant should assume all con-
tracts made by the other with land-owners. The defendant
company obtained the charter. The unsuccessful association
had entered into an agreement with Preston for the purchase
of his land. The defendant having changed its route some-
what, so that Preston's land was of no use to it, refused to
buy or fulfil the contract. Preston filed this bill, to which the
defendant demurred.
The Court said: "The doctrine in equity on this subject,
where projectors of a company enter into contracts on behalf
of a body not existing 'at the time of the contract but to be
called into existence afterwards, is that if the body for whom
19 Simons, 264, s. c. 3 M. & C. 773 (I838).
2 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 462.
'St Leonard's opinion in Hawkes v. Eastern Counties R. Y. Co., 4
Eng. L. & Eq. gr (185I), where other cases are cited.
47 Eng. Law. & Eq. 124.
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the projectors acted does not come into existence, it cannot
take the benefit of the contract without performing that part
of it which the projectors undertook that it should perform;
that is, in substance, this Court treats the projectors for that
purpose as agents of the company so afterwards called into
existence." The demurrer was, therefore, overruled.
The case was appealed to the House of Lords on the con-
struction of the contract, but was not reported till five years
later.' In the meantime it was followed both here and in
England, and is still very generally cited for the proposition
that a corporation comes into existence cur onere, the fact
having been overlooked, in a large number of instances, that
the case was re-argued and a different result reached.
When the case came before the House of Lords on appeal,2
Lord Chancellor Cranworth said: "The plaintiff's theoryis, that
the company comes into existence cum onere. I am aware
that that is a doctrine acted upon by Lord Cottenham ...
And it has been acted upon in so many cases that it would be
very inexpedient offhand to say that that doctrine cannot be
sustained, when one considers how much may have been done
upon the faith of it. I must, however, own that when the
subject comes to be very closely examined, I think there are
objections of the gravest nature to its adoption, objections
which do not seem sufficiently to have pressed upon the mind
of his lordship. Lord Cottenham acted upon this principle
that the railroad company was the successor of the projectors
or the assignee, if one may say so, of the projectors, and must
take existence subject to the burdens which had been con-
tracted for by those who were the promoters of it and to whom
it owed its existence. . . . Observe, my lords, to what this
doctrine leads. There is that case of Lord Petrie, at which
everybody starts when he hears it, in which there was a
contract entered into by the projectors of a company that, if
Lord P. would withdraw his opposition they would pay him
£120,000 for that which was not worth above /4ooo. It may
be that some of those who purchased the shares of that com-
15 H. of L. 6o5 (1856).
2 5 H. of L. 6o5 (I856).
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pany were aware of that contract; but in all probability that
was not the case with the majority. If this might be done
once, as in the case of Lord P., it might have been done with
ten other landed proprietors, and there would have been a
million of the capital of the subscribers contracted away from
them without any sort of knowledge upon their part and for
purposes quite foreign from those for which they subscribed.
If, therefore, this case had turned upon the validity or non-
validity of that doctrine, I should have desired of your lord-
ship's further time to consider as to the course which was to
be taken; but it does not.",, "i ' /
The Court then proceeded to constru6 the contract and
came to the conclusion that it was not a contract to pay
.x,5000 for withdrawing opposition, but that plaintiff was to
have received this sum if opposition were withdrawn and the
land taken. That the taking of the land by the corporation
was a condition precedent to its liability. That, as the land
had not been taken, the contract fell, and it was not necessary
to consider whether or not the corporation would have been
bound if the contract had been interpreted differently.
Though the Court avoids expressly overruling the earlier
cases, it is apparent from the fact that, by far, the greater part
of the opinion is devoted to a stringent criticism of this doctrine
promulgated by Lord Cottenham, that their dissent from it
was intended to have the weight of authority. The case was
argued at length and carefully considered, and the dictum
expressed is so strong that it must be considered to have
discredited the former rule.
The attitude of the Court upon the subject is even more
clearly indicated in the opinion of Lord Brougham : " I have
more than doubts of the soundness of those dicta, I may say
of those judgments of my noble and learned friend, now no
more; I have more than doubts. I think they were carrying
very far, indeed, a great deal too far, certain doctrines which
had themselves been the subject of dispute."
The specific performance prayed for was therefore refused.
In the same year 1856 the doctrine was again strongly
assailed in the House of Lords, in the case of The Caledonian
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& Dumbartonshire Junction R. R. v. The Magi trates of Helens-
burgh.1 The Magistrates contracted with the "Committee of
Management " of the proposed company, undertaking to extend
the harbor of Helensburgh and erect a quay; the company to
pay part of the expenses. The magistrates having performed
their part, bring a bill for specific performance, the defense
resting on the ground that the company is not bound by the
acts of its promoters.
The Court said: The argument of appellee "proceeds on
the ground that the Committee of Management ought to be
treated in the nature of agents for the company, which owes
its existence to their exertions, and when the company came
into being it was, from its very birth, bound to fulfil the con-
tracts by which its projectors had stipulated that it should be
bound. This reasoning rests on the assumption that a railway
company, when established by Parliament is, in substance
though not is form, a body succeeding to the rights and
coming into the place of the projectors. . . .When such a
body applies, however, for incorporation, what they ask for is
not an act incorporating themselves only, but all who may be:
willing to subscribe the specified sums and so become share-
holders, and those becoming shareholders have a right to.
consider that they are entitled to all the benefit held out to,
them by the act and liable to no obligation beyond those
which are there indicated. . . If secret and unexpected terms.
are to be held binding on those who take shares, the result
may be ruinous to those who act on the faith of what appears
on the face of the legislative incorporation. . . I can discover"
no principle, legal or equitable, whereby such contracts can be
held to be obligatory on the company.' . .In holding that
the company is a body different from its projectors in sub--
stance as well as form, I am acting on what is the mere truth,
and no injustice can arise to those who have dealt with the
projectors, for against them and all under whose authority
they acted, there will be a clear right of action if the company
does not fulfil theengagements which they have contracted
that it shall perform, and that is surely all which those who,
'2 Macq. H. of L. Cases, 393 (1856).
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:have dealt with the projectors can claim as their right. For
.these reasons I am of opinion that on principle there is no
ground for holding that a company is bound by any engage-
ment made by those who obtained its act of incorporation,
unless those engagements are embodied in the act of incor-
-poration itself." After a careful consideration of all the
authorities, the Court goes on to say: "I have stated my
reason for thinking that such a doctrine rests on no sound
-principle and may lead as, in Lord Petrie's case, I think it did
lead, to great injustice. And if, therefore, the case now to be
decided was in all respects similar to the three cases I have
referred to, what I should have to decide would be whether I
should advise your lordships to adhere to the precedents
established by Lord Cottenham, on the ground that it is
-unsafe to act against a series of decisions even though they
may appear not to rest on any solid foundation, or to depart
from them and to adopt what I consider a just and more
,correct principle." His lordship tlereupon differentiated
this case from the others on the ground that the contract to
.pay for erecting a quay and enlarging the harbor, though
ultimately for the good of the company, was not within its
powers, and that since even a contract made by the directors
-could not be enforced against the company under such cir-
cumstances, certainly one made by promoters could not be.
This decision, like that of Preston v. R. R. Co.,' while avoid-
,ng the necessity of overruling the former cases, is unstinting
in its condemnation of the theory therein contained, and since
its time the doctrine, that a corporation can come into existence
subject to burdens imposed upon it by its promoters, has never
found credence in England. It has been suggested, indeed,
that the case of Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink Cd.,',rested upon
this ground, but that case came up on demurrbr'tq.Ta bill which
charged that the defendant company had atLgd upon and
.adopted .the contract made for it by its promoters, and that,
therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to have the agreement
performed. And the Court held, that the demurrer having
'5 H..ofL.. 6o5 ([856).
-27 Ch. Diiv. 368 (1878).
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admitted the fact of adoption, the plaintiff was entitled to the
relief claimed, and the demurrer was thereupon overruled.
The only thing decided, therefore, was that after the company
came into existence it might voluntarily adopt the contract
and become bound under it. Whether or not such doctrine
be sound, it is an entirely different theory from the one under
consideration, for it involves the conception that the obligation
rests upon the intention of the company as expressed in its
voluntary act, whereas, in Lord Cottenham's view the corpora-
tion enters upon its existence, cure onere.
§ 2. Not applicable at law.
It has been asserted' that this doctrine was, in England, of
general applicability and in vogue both in courts of law and
equity, and Mr. Redfield, in support of this proposition, cites
the case of Howden v. Simpson.' That was an action of debt
brought by Lord Howden against Sir John Simpson and
others, formerly projectors of a railroad company, upon an
instrument, under seal, in which the defendants had agreed to
pay the plaintiff £5ooo for withdrawing his opposition to a
bill granting a charter to the railroad. The only question
involved was whether or not such a contract was legal, in
view of the fact that Lord Howden was a member of Parlia-
ment at the time. No attempt was made to hold the company,
so that the case does not support the proposition advanced.
Pointing to a contrary conclusion is the case of Payne v.
Coal Co.3 Promoters of the coal company, after provisional,
but before complete registration, promised the plaintiffs that if
they would give up their plan of organizing a similar company,
they would see that plaintiffs should be made ship brokers for
the defendant company when formed, and that said company
would give plaintiffs a free passage to Australia. Assumpsit
for breach of contract, in that the company refused so to do,
though plaintiffs had performed their engagement. in the
matter.
I Redfield on Railroads, s Ed. p. 25.
2Keen, 583, 3 M. & Cr. 97, io Ad. & Ellis, 793, 9 Cl. & F. 61.
'3 io Exch. 281 (1854).
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Platt, B., said, "I am clearly of opinion, that it was beyond
the power of the provisionally registered company to bind the
completely registered company by entering into the contract."
This decision denies the applicability of the so-called equity
doctrine of cume onere, to cases at law, at a time when that
doctrine was at its height in the courts of equity, and it seems
probable from the statements made in Melhado v. Porto Algere
Co.,' and Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink Co.,2 that the distinction
in this respect between the two jurisdictions was always main-
tained.
The cases discussed in criticism of this doctrine, have dwelt
largely upon the unfortunate practical results which would
follow its adoption, the underlying thought being that if a
company could be saddled with all the undertakings of its
projectors, it would be brought into being, (through the
incompetency or unscrupulousness of the promoters), in a
condition unfit for the transaction of business, with the capital
stock diminished or exhausted, and the stockholders (who
could have had no notice of the transaction prior to incorpora-
tion) left without any adequate return for their money.
The doctrine seems also open to criticism on more theo-
retical grounds. It requires that the promoters be conceived
of in one of two characters. Either as being in substance the
corporation itself, as was suggested in the earlier cases on the
subject, or as being agents of the company with power to bind
it. It is clear that the conception in either case would be a
pt~re fiction. That a corporation has no existence till it has
received legislative sanction in some form or other, is well
settled,' and it is a mere truism when one says that any body
of persons applying for such legislative sanction in the form of
a charter can, under no circumstances, be the corporation
which they are endeavoring to create. Unless they are con-
ceived of as, in fact, the same body, the conclusion that the
corporation stands in the same position as the promoters with
all their rights and subject to all their liabilities would seem to
I L. R. 9 C. P.503 (1874).
27 Ch. Div. 368 (1878).
3 Thompson on Corps., 35.
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be untenable. Again, it is well established that the corpora-
tion is distinct from the sum of its members,' so that what
they might do in their individual capacities should not on
theory bind the distinct and subsequently created company.
This view is undoubtedly the one now generally adopted both
in England and in this country.
2
The theory of agency is equally untenable, for the correla-
tive of "agent " is "principal" and there being no principal
in existence the relationship cannot exist; and this is now
uniformly acknowledged.3
Except as a fiction, therefore, this doctrine that a company
can be bound before it is formed, and enters upon its corporate
life "cur onere," must be considered unfounded in principle.
As a fiction, the cases have shown that it works deplorable
results. It is discredited 'in England, and has not been fol-
lowed (as far as can be ascertained) since the decision in
Caledonian R. R. Co. v. Helensburg h . The American authorities
repudiate it 5
There seems, then, to be no longer any distinction, either
here or in England. between the doctrines existing in the law
and equity courts. But though the doctrine has been aban-
doned in its original form, the thought has not entirely passed
away in America, that a relationship of agency exists between
the promoter and the corporation.
Macolm Lloyd, Jr.
I Thompson on Corp., . 1- 3 .
2 Battelle v. Cement Co., 33 N. W. 327 (Mo. 1887) ; Munson v. R. R.
Co., 1O3 N. Y. 58 (1886) ; In re Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co., 33
Ch. Div. I6 (1886); In re Empress Engineering Co., 16 Ch. Div. 125
(i8o).
3 Schreyer v. Turner Co., 43 P. 719 (Oregon, 1896) ; Weatherford R. R.
Co. v. Granger, 24 S. W. 795 (Texas, 1894); Long v. Bank, 29 P. 878
(Utah, 1892) ; Battelle v. Cement Co., 33 N. W. 327 (Mo. 1887) ; Buffington
v. Bardon, 50 N. W. 776 (Wisc. i89i ) ; Joy v. Manion, 28 Mo. App. 55
(1887) ; Davis v. Maysville Creamery Assn., 63 Mo. App. 477 (1895);
Huron Printing & Binding Co. v. Kittleson, 37 N. W. 233 (S. D. 1884);
Pittsburgh Copper Co. v. Quintrell, 20 S. W. 248 (Texas, 1892).
42 Macq. H. of L. 393 (1856).
5 Cases cited, supra.
